George Edward Moore, a pivotal figure in 20th-century thought, profoundly shaped analytic philosophy alongside luminaries like Bertrand Russell. His intellectual journey marked a significant departure from prevailing idealism, championing a philosophy rooted in common sense.
Known for his insightful work on ethics and epistemology, G. E. Moore left an indelible mark on philosophical discourse. His contributions, especially in ethical non-naturalism, continue to be studied and debated by scholars worldwide, establishing him as one of the most influential figures in contemporary philosophy.
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The life and academic career of G. E. Moore
Born on November 4, 1873, in Upper Norwood, south-east London, G. E. Moore was the middle of seven children to Daniel Moore, a medical doctor, and Henrietta Sturge. His early education took place at Dulwich College, a preparatory school renowned for its academic rigor. It was here that the foundations of his intellectual curiosity were laid.
In 1892, Moore commenced his studies at Trinity College, Cambridge, initially focusing on classics. However, his intellectual interests soon led him to delve into moral sciences, a field that would become central to his life’s work. He excelled academically, achieving a remarkable double first in his tripos examinations, a testament to his profound understanding and dedication.
His exceptional academic performance earned him a highly coveted Fellowship at Trinity College in 1898, a position he held for several years, allowing him to dedicate himself fully to philosophical inquiry. This period at Cambridge was crucial, as it brought him into close contact with other burgeoning minds who would later define analytic philosophy, including Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein.
From 1925 to 1939, G. E. Moore served as the Professor of Mental Philosophy and Logic at the University of Cambridge, influencing generations of students and scholars. Beyond his teaching, he was deeply involved in the philosophical community, famously editing the prestigious journal Mind from 1921 to 1947. Furthermore, he presided over the Cambridge University Moral Sciences Club from 1912 to 1944, fostering vibrant discussions among his peers.
Moore was an admired member of the secretive Cambridge Apostles, an elite discussion group. Bertrand Russell, a fellow member, once expressed an almost worshipful admiration for Moore, considering him an “ideal of genius.” This highlights the profound respect and influence G. E. Moore commanded among his contemporaries. His clear and circumspect writing style, coupled with a methodical approach to complex problems, set him apart as a distinguished Cambridge philosopher.
G. E. Moore’s pivotal philosophical contributions
G. E. Moore is perhaps best known for his staunch defense of ethical non-naturalism, particularly articulated in his seminal work, Principia Ethica, published in 1903. This book became one of the primary inspirations for the subsequent reaction against ethical naturalism, significantly shaping 20th-century discussions in meta-ethics and establishing connections to broader themes in philosophy and wisdom.
In Principia Ethica, Moore argued that fundamental ethical properties, such as goodness, are simple, non-natural properties that cannot be defined or reduced to natural properties. He famously introduced the concept of the naturalistic fallacy, asserting that it is a mistake to define moral terms like ‘good’ in terms of natural properties (e.g., pleasure, happiness, utility). For instance, to say “good is pleasure” is, for Moore, a fallacy because it equates an indefinable property with a definable one. This argument has had lasting implications for ethical theory, sparking extensive debate about the nature of moral language and properties.
Beyond ethics, G. E. Moore was a staunch advocate for common sense in philosophical methodology. His essays “A Defence of Common Sense” and “A Proof of the External World” stand as powerful defenses against philosophical skepticism. In these works, Moore argued for the undeniable truth of certain common-sense beliefs, such as the existence of an external world and other minds, asserting that these beliefs are more certain than any philosophical argument that attempts to refute them.
Moore’s approach contrasted sharply with what he perceived as a lack of progress in modern philosophy, which he viewed as a stark contrast to the dramatic advances seen in the natural sciences since the Renaissance. He believed that many philosophical problems arose from a misunderstanding or misuse of language, advocating for a return to clear, precise conceptual analysis. This emphasis on clarity and common-sense intuition positions G. E. Moore as a foundational figure in analytic philosophy.
His philosophical legacy is also marked by Moore’s paradox, a logical puzzle concerning statements like “It is raining, but I don’t believe it is raining.” This paradox highlights the unique epistemic relationship between belief and assertion, demonstrating a tension between the content of a statement and the act of asserting it. This conceptual subtlety further illustrates Moore’s meticulous engagement with philosophical problems and connects to broader discussions about truth and reality.
Later life and lasting influence
In his later years, G. E. Moore continued to be a revered figure in philosophical circles, though he largely abstained from the more informal social groupings like the Bloomsbury Group, despite their admiration for him. He was a humanist, presiding over the British Ethical Union (now Humanists UK) from 1935 to 1936, reflecting his commitment to secular ethics and human values.
His significant contributions were formally recognized when he was appointed to the Order of Merit in 1951, one of the highest honors in the United Kingdom. This award underscored his profound impact not only on philosophy but also on the broader intellectual landscape. Moore’s influence extended globally, with his works translated and studied extensively, particularly influencing developments in English philosophy.
G. E. Moore passed away in England on October 24, 1958, at the Evelyn Nursing Home. He was cremated at Cambridge Crematorium, and his ashes were interred at the Parish of the Ascension Burial Ground, where his wife, Dorothy Ely (1892–1977), was also buried. They had two sons, Nicholas Moore, a notable poet, and Timothy Moore, a composer. The enduring clarity and analytical rigor of G. E. Moore’s work solidified his place as one of the most influential British philosophers, whose insights into ethics, common sense, and the nature of philosophical inquiry continue to resonate within contemporary thought.
References
- “George Edward Moore”. Encyclopædia Britannica. Available at: https://www.britannica.com/biography/G-E-Moore
- “G. E. Moore”. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Available at: https://iep.utm.edu/moore/
- “Moore, George Edward”. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Available at: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moore/
- “The Bloomsbury Group: G. E. Moore”. The Great Thinkers. Available at: https://thegreatthinkers.org/moore-g-e/
George Edward Moore was a prominent English philosopher, recognized as one of the initiators of analytic philosophy alongside Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Gottlob Frege. He was crucial in shifting British philosophy away from idealism towards common-sense concepts, making significant contributions to ethics, epistemology, and metaphysics, and was dubbed “the most revered philosopher of his era.”
Moore’s most celebrated works include his seminal book *Principia Ethica*, which profoundly influenced meta-ethics and reacted against ethical naturalism. He is also known for essays like “The Refutation of Idealism,” “A Defence of Common Sense,” and “A Proof of the External World,” emphasizing common sense in philosophical methodology and contributing to the paradox that bears his name.
As a Professor of Philosophy at the University of Cambridge and editor of the journal *Mind*, Moore significantly influenced his contemporaries, including Bertrand Russell, who once described him with “extravagant admiration.” He was an admired member of the Cambridge Apostles and, though he abstained from the Bloomsbury Group, his *Principia Ethica* impacted their ethical discussions, earning him the title “the most revered philosopher of his era.”
Beyond his professorship at Cambridge, Moore held several significant roles. He edited the influential philosophical journal *Mind* from 1921 to 1947, was chairman of the Cambridge University Moral Sciences Club, and presided over the British Ethical Union (now Humanists UK) from 1935 to 1936. His contributions were recognized with his appointment to the Order of Merit in 1951.
